Efficiency, equality and labelling: an experimental investigation of focal points in explicit bargainin
We experimentally investigate, in an unstructured bargaining environment with commonly known money p...
Experiments with the ultimatum game -- where one party can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a sec...
This paper investigates whether information about fairness types can be useful in lowering dispute c...
We investigate Schelling's hypothesis that payoff-irrelevant labels ("cues") can influence the outco...
Schelling proposed that payoff-irrelevant cues can affect the outcome of tacit bargaining games by c...
AbstractWe use a new experimental design to test Schelling's hypotheses about the nature and effecti...
We use a new experimental design to test Schelling's hypotheses about the nature and effectiveness o...
This paper is a review of experiments that have investigated the role of focal point reasoning in ba...
We report the results of a new tacit bargaining experiment that provides two key insights about the ...
We conduct a bargaining experiment where interaction is tacit and payoffs are earned and cumulated i...
We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, eff...
This is a contribution to the growing experimental literature on how trial-and-error adjustment proc...
We report the results of a new tacit bargaining experiment that provides two key insights about the ...
We report the results of a new tacit bargaining experiment that provides two key insights about the ...
In many matching markets bargaining determines who matches with whom and on what terms. We experimen...
We experimentally investigate, in an unstructured bargaining environment with commonly known money p...
Experiments with the ultimatum game -- where one party can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a sec...
This paper investigates whether information about fairness types can be useful in lowering dispute c...
We investigate Schelling's hypothesis that payoff-irrelevant labels ("cues") can influence the outco...
Schelling proposed that payoff-irrelevant cues can affect the outcome of tacit bargaining games by c...
AbstractWe use a new experimental design to test Schelling's hypotheses about the nature and effecti...
We use a new experimental design to test Schelling's hypotheses about the nature and effectiveness o...
This paper is a review of experiments that have investigated the role of focal point reasoning in ba...
We report the results of a new tacit bargaining experiment that provides two key insights about the ...
We conduct a bargaining experiment where interaction is tacit and payoffs are earned and cumulated i...
We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, eff...
This is a contribution to the growing experimental literature on how trial-and-error adjustment proc...
We report the results of a new tacit bargaining experiment that provides two key insights about the ...
We report the results of a new tacit bargaining experiment that provides two key insights about the ...
In many matching markets bargaining determines who matches with whom and on what terms. We experimen...
We experimentally investigate, in an unstructured bargaining environment with commonly known money p...
Experiments with the ultimatum game -- where one party can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a sec...
This paper investigates whether information about fairness types can be useful in lowering dispute c...
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