Wittgenstein, Moore and the lure of transcendental idealism

This paper explores the place of realist and idealist themes in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. It takes as its starting point Adrian Moore's denial that transcendental idealism (TI) is present in that text only as an "enemy"—to be "diagnosed and dispelled," as Peter Sullivan puts it. I question whether reflection on TI can perform the positive task which Moore's reading assigns to it—in particular, whether coming to recognize its ultimate incoherence leads us to a recognition of "the forces that give this nonsense the appearance of sense in the first place." On the basis of an understanding of those forces that is present in Moore's own work, I argue that reflection on the quasi-realist themes manifest in Wittgenstein's remarks on picturing perform that task more successfully. In this way, I question the special status that Moore assigns to TI in the Tractatus, his claiming—"with . . . myriad qualifications"—that "Wittgenstein is a transcendental idealist."