Unscheduled stock options to target chief executive officers (CEOs) are a nontrivial phenomenon during private merger negotiations. In 920 acquisition bids during 1999-2007, over 13% of targets grant them. These options substitute for golden parachutes and compensate target CEOs for the benefits they forfeit because of the merger. Targets granting unscheduled options are more likely to be acquired but they earn lower premiums. Consequently, deal value drops by '62 for every dollar target CEOs receive from unscheduled options. Conversely, acquirers of targets offering these awards experience higher returns. Therefore, deals involving unscheduled grants exhibit a transfer of wealth from target shareholders to bidder shareholders
Corporate takeovers are major investments that present managers with opportunities that can exacerba...
We document that firms can effectively retain executives by granting deferred equity pay. We show th...
We document that firms can effectively retain executives by granting deferred equity pay. We show th...
Do merger bonuses to target CEOs facilitate a wealth transfer from target to acquirer shareholders? ...
This paper examines the relation between executive compensation and value creation in merger waves. ...
We study benefits received by target company CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. These execu...
We study benefits received by target company CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. These execu...
In addition to golden parachutes, CEOs often negotiate for personal side-payments in connection with...
In addition to golden parachutes, CEOs often negotiate for personal side payments in connection with...
We study benefits received by target company CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. These execu...
Stock option grants to top managers have largely contributed to the dramatic increase in US executiv...
In acquisitions, target chief executive officers (CEOs) face a moral hazard: Any personal gain from ...
In addition to golden parachutes, CEOs often negotiate for personal side-payments in connection with...
We study benefits received by target company CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. These execu...
Due to a variety of liquidity constraints, CEOs of U.S. corporations hold highly undiversified portf...
Corporate takeovers are major investments that present managers with opportunities that can exacerba...
We document that firms can effectively retain executives by granting deferred equity pay. We show th...
We document that firms can effectively retain executives by granting deferred equity pay. We show th...
Do merger bonuses to target CEOs facilitate a wealth transfer from target to acquirer shareholders? ...
This paper examines the relation between executive compensation and value creation in merger waves. ...
We study benefits received by target company CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. These execu...
We study benefits received by target company CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. These execu...
In addition to golden parachutes, CEOs often negotiate for personal side-payments in connection with...
In addition to golden parachutes, CEOs often negotiate for personal side payments in connection with...
We study benefits received by target company CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. These execu...
Stock option grants to top managers have largely contributed to the dramatic increase in US executiv...
In acquisitions, target chief executive officers (CEOs) face a moral hazard: Any personal gain from ...
In addition to golden parachutes, CEOs often negotiate for personal side-payments in connection with...
We study benefits received by target company CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. These execu...
Due to a variety of liquidity constraints, CEOs of U.S. corporations hold highly undiversified portf...
Corporate takeovers are major investments that present managers with opportunities that can exacerba...
We document that firms can effectively retain executives by granting deferred equity pay. We show th...
We document that firms can effectively retain executives by granting deferred equity pay. We show th...