The Presumption of Innocence: A Legal Spectroscope for Article 101 TFEU

This thesis examines the enforcement of art 101 TFEU by the European Commission through the lens of the Charter, in particular, art 48(1) thereof which provides for the presumption of innocence. The fact that the fines imposed by the Commission in competition proceedings are considered to be ‘criminal charges’ by the ECtHR seems to have been settled for quite some time now. Granted, the EU has not acceded yet to the ECHR and, thus, the CJEU is not officially bound by the Strasbourg organs’ jurisprudence. Nonetheless, the Charter which is now binding upon the Commission is modelled upon the ECHR and its rights corresponding to the ones enshrined in the ECHR have, explicitly, the same scope and meaning.1 Furthermore, the CJEU and the ECtHR have had a long-standing tradition tending to convergence as regards their jurisprudence in human rights. The research demonstrates that the presumption of innocence (hereinafter PI), except for its dimension as a human right which presents much perplexity, is also a legal rule of evidence within the common law understanding. This purpose of the PI does not seem to have attracted much of the ECtHR’s attention throughout the years; however, in the author’s view, there is an overlap between some of the PI’s corollaries as an evidential rule and the procedural corollaries of the PI as a human right which are, in fact, extensively developed in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Finally, the research reflects on the compatibility of the enforcement of art 101 TFEU with the PI as a rule of evidence enshrined in the Charter