Collaboration or Coordination Games in CFSP Why Does the European Foreign Policy Lack Coherence?

During the past decade, the debate on European foreign policy often inclined towards a criticism of its coherence and effectiveness, especially in its security and defence dimensions. Using rational choice institutionalism and functional regime theories, the central research problem that this thesis sets out to explore is the character of cooperation within Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The paper argues that CFSP can be considered a collaboration game, in relation with one of coordination. From this perspective, centralised institutions are needed. Crisis management empirically illustrates that collective action requires supranational institutions. Moreover, the EU crisis management responses to the conflicts in Bosnia and Macedonia confirm that cooperation in CFSP is facilitated by the communitarisation of security and defence issues. Additionally, the paper demonstrates why in its current intergovernmental setting, the CFSP is far from complying with the Amsterdam's Treaty prerequisite of coherence. By reviewing the benefits principals draw from delegating certain functions to agents, such as agenda-setting, monitoring, implementation, and representation, this thesis shows that CFSP benefits from a transfer of competencies to a supranational institution