Demokratins avgränsningsproblem : En kritik av det kosmopolitiska demokratiidealet

The aim of this paper is to examine whether the theory of cosmopolitan democracy provides a satisfactory solution to the boundary problem in democratic theory. I argue that David Held's version of cosmopolitan democracy rests on two incompatible principles: the all-affected principle and the all-inclusive principle. However, the theory does not need to presuppose both these principles; it requires only one of them. Furthermore, I try to show that both of these principles fail to provide an adequate solution to the boundary problem. The all-inclusive principle suggests that all citizens of the world should be included in a global democratic unit. I argue that such an ideal is not desirable since it conflicts with the principle of subsidiarity and withdraws from regional political communities their sovereignty. The all-affected principle suggests that everyone who is affected by a decision ought to have a say in its making. I argue that the all-affected principle is problematic for several reasons, my main criticisms being that: (a) it does not provide an adequate formulation of what it means to be ?relevantly affected?, (b) it does not seem to be compatible with representative democracy, (c) it makes unnecessary and misdirected demands on symmetry between those who are affected by a decision and the decision-makers. As an alternative solution I argue that those who are ?governed by? a democratic unit should be included in its demos. However, this principle does not seem to be able to deal with cross-border issues. For that reason I suggest that the governed-by principle should be combined with a limited version of the all-affected principle which only includes negative influence on citizen's primary interests