Konsekvenser av tredjepartstillträde för en lokal fjärrvärmemarknad

Problem: There are strong forces from for instance politicians, who want to allow third party access to the district heating market, as has already been done in the electricity and gas markets. But what would be the consequences of a third party access to the district heating market? Will it create a competitive market, and will it be able to put any pressure on the prices? What will be the consequences for the current monopoly holder? Purpose: The purpose is to investigate the impact of allowing third party access to a local district heating market Methods: The questions raised have been answered with a case study at the district heating system in Helsingborg. Qualitative interviews have been carried out with employees at the energy company Öresundskraft in Helsingborg and with people with key competences within the appropriate authorities, organisations and other companies. In addition to this, secondary data from books, articles, government nvestigations etc. have been used in the study. Due to uncertainties in some areas, scenario analysis has been applied in the analysis. Conclusions: Although the district heating distribution network in Helsingborg is one of the largest in Sweden, we can not see that it is large enough to create conditions for competition neither on the market nor on the production side with third party access. The price will continue to be set according to the alternative price for the customer even with third party access. Existing industrial surplus heat producers will however get the possibility to sell their heat direct to the end user. With current conditions, there will be no change in profit to mention for the existing surplus heat producers if they choose to sell direct to end customer in comparison the supplier model of today. Since no competition will be created in one of the larger distribution networks in Sweden, this implies that there will be no competition worth mentioning in the majority of the district heating systems in Sweden. Thanks to the third party access, the industrial surplus heat will get the possibility of connecting to the local district heating systems, and thereby give the surplus heat producers the possibility to sell off the surplus heat. If the alternative is to get nothing at all for the surplus heat, our calculations show that the economical gain generated by the sold surplus heat is large enough that it motivates to connect it to the district heating distribution network even if it results in large initial investments