1970ネンダイ　ニ　オケル　カクヘイキ　ノ　ユウコウセイ　ニ　カンスル　ニンシキ　ノ　ヘンヨウ　カクヘイキ　ノ　コウカ　ト　ソノ　ヒヨウ

Much of the current literature on nuclear weapons has focused on their inhumanity, and anti-nuclear weapons groups have insisted that the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty stigmatized the weapons as “inhumane.” However, some have also recognized the value of these weapons, in terms such as nuclear deterrence. Although some researchers claim that such value is groundless, the question we should ask is not whether such value exists or not, but rather why there has been a tendency to embrace such value. This paper examines how and why such value was created and ascertains the turning point of this value creation. Until the end of 1960s, policy makers were confronted with uncertainties regarding nuclear weapons. They were not well-informed about the effects of the weapons, or nuclear deterrence and its costs. In the 1970s, US-Soviet arms control, international debate about the economic effect of the nuclear arms race, and nuclear proliferation reduced the uncertainties. Thereby, the policy makers had come to realize the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and its high price.投稿論文Refereed Articl