Add to ORKGInterpretivism is often seen as the theory according to which mental state ascription is useful, even though mental states do no really exist. this “as if” theory is widely held to be untenable. In this paper I argue that in order to avoid an “as if” reading of interpretivism, we should embrace the strongest version of this theory
This paper investigates the crucial notion of a "canonical ascription statement" in Bruno Mölder's /...
Most, if not all of us, are in practice mental realists: We explain and predict each other's actions...
Some contemporary philosophers suggest that we know just by introspection that folk psychological st...
Interpretivism is often seen as the theory according to which mental state ascription is useful, eve...
In this critical notice I raise a couple of questions concerning Mölder’s ambitious metaphysics, aim...
Bruno Mölder’s Mind Ascribed offers an important and impressive criticism of substantial naturalisti...
This paper is a reply to commentaries on Mind Ascribed. My response is organised into three parts. I...
The following paper investigates the crucial notion of a “canonical ascription statement” in Bruno M...
I have proposed wedding the theories of belief known as dispositionalism and interpretivism. Krzyszt...
In a recent article in this journal, Krzysztof Poslajko reconstructs—and endorses as probative—a dil...
What is interpretivism? As is common with broad methodological debates, much hinges on matters of d...
The aim of this paper is to show that the interpretivist account of propositional attitudes fails ev...
In this paper, I defend Non-Inferentialism about mental states, the view that we can perceive some m...
This paper investigates the crucial notion of a "canonical ascription statement" in Bruno Mölder's /...
Most, if not all of us, are in practice mental realists: We explain and predict each other's actions...
Some contemporary philosophers suggest that we know just by introspection that folk psychological st...
Interpretivism is often seen as the theory according to which mental state ascription is useful, eve...
In this critical notice I raise a couple of questions concerning Mölder’s ambitious metaphysics, aim...
Bruno Mölder’s Mind Ascribed offers an important and impressive criticism of substantial naturalisti...
This paper is a reply to commentaries on Mind Ascribed. My response is organised into three parts. I...
The following paper investigates the crucial notion of a “canonical ascription statement” in Bruno M...
I have proposed wedding the theories of belief known as dispositionalism and interpretivism. Krzyszt...
In a recent article in this journal, Krzysztof Poslajko reconstructs—and endorses as probative—a dil...
What is interpretivism? As is common with broad methodological debates, much hinges on matters of d...
The aim of this paper is to show that the interpretivist account of propositional attitudes fails ev...
In this paper, I defend Non-Inferentialism about mental states, the view that we can perceive some m...
This paper investigates the crucial notion of a "canonical ascription statement" in Bruno Mölder's /...
Most, if not all of us, are in practice mental realists: We explain and predict each other's actions...
Some contemporary philosophers suggest that we know just by introspection that folk psychological st...