Add to ORKGThis paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three country tax competition model where countries differ in size. We characterize equilibrium tax rates and the optimal tax responses due to the formation of an enhanced cooperation agreement. Conditions for strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability of tax rates are crucial for the welfare effects of enhanced cooperation. Simulations show that enhanced cooperation is unlikely to be feasible for small countries. When enhanced cooperation is feasible, it may hamper global harmonization. Only when countries are of similar size is global harmonization a feasible outcome
Current policy initiatives taken by the EU and the OECD aim at abolishing preferential corporate tax...
This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sus...
The tax competition for mobile capital, in particular the reluctance of small countries to agree on ...
textabstractThis paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three cou...
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model that isrich enough to capture some of the central fe...
textabstractIn this thesis I study the harmful competition between national governments to attract ...
An important puzzle in corporate taxation is that effective tax rates have fallen significantly whil...
We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. ...
This paper provides a challenging view to the tax harmonization issue. The literature often proposes...
Han Y, Pieretti P, Zou B. On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes an...
This article assesses the economic implications of the introduction of consolidation with formula ap...
In our paper we show that when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures, coordination through...
In this paper, we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within an...
This paper analyzes a model of corporate tax competition with repeated interaction and with strategi...
This article uses the main tools of cooperative game theory, the core of a game and the Shapley valu...
Current policy initiatives taken by the EU and the OECD aim at abolishing preferential corporate tax...
This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sus...
The tax competition for mobile capital, in particular the reluctance of small countries to agree on ...
textabstractThis paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three cou...
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model that isrich enough to capture some of the central fe...
textabstractIn this thesis I study the harmful competition between national governments to attract ...
An important puzzle in corporate taxation is that effective tax rates have fallen significantly whil...
We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. ...
This paper provides a challenging view to the tax harmonization issue. The literature often proposes...
Han Y, Pieretti P, Zou B. On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes an...
This article assesses the economic implications of the introduction of consolidation with formula ap...
In our paper we show that when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures, coordination through...
In this paper, we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within an...
This paper analyzes a model of corporate tax competition with repeated interaction and with strategi...
This article uses the main tools of cooperative game theory, the core of a game and the Shapley valu...
Current policy initiatives taken by the EU and the OECD aim at abolishing preferential corporate tax...
This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sus...
The tax competition for mobile capital, in particular the reluctance of small countries to agree on ...