We show that in countries with strong investor protection, developed financial markets, and active markets for corporate control, family firms evolve into widely held companies as they age. In countries with weak investor protection, less developed financial markets, and inactive markets for corporate control, family control is very persistent over time. While family control in high investor protection countries is concentrated in industries that have low investment opportunities and low merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, the same is not so in countries that have low investor protection, where the presence of family control in an industry is unrelated to investment opportunities and M&A activity
By using a unique and detailed data set on China's family firms, we investigate the effect of i...
Growth is important for the long-term success of a business. Regrettably, the impact of family influ...
This study uses a comprehensive European dataset to investigate the role of family control in corpor...
We show that in countries with strong investor protection, developed financial markets and active ma...
We propose and test a family firm growth model. Specifically, we analyze the link between the nature...
We test what explains family control of firms and industries and find that the explanation is largel...
We evaluate the link between family ownership and cross-border investment behavior. By analyzing a s...
We investigate how ownership and family control influence the decision to take part in M&As as an ac...
This article studies European acquisitions in the period 1990-2013 to examine the relationship betwe...
Family ownership and control play an important role in large firms in Asia. There is a puzzle regard...
We investigate the relation between family ownership and control and firm performance across countri...
A recent stream of literature shows that family control is central in most countries of the world, b...
We examine the propensity to raise outside capital, both equity and debt, by family firms and compar...
We investigate how family ownership influences the industry-diversifying nature of M&As by listed co...
This monograph reviews 76 published empirical studies in relation to listed family corporations. Exi...
By using a unique and detailed data set on China's family firms, we investigate the effect of i...
Growth is important for the long-term success of a business. Regrettably, the impact of family influ...
This study uses a comprehensive European dataset to investigate the role of family control in corpor...
We show that in countries with strong investor protection, developed financial markets and active ma...
We propose and test a family firm growth model. Specifically, we analyze the link between the nature...
We test what explains family control of firms and industries and find that the explanation is largel...
We evaluate the link between family ownership and cross-border investment behavior. By analyzing a s...
We investigate how ownership and family control influence the decision to take part in M&As as an ac...
This article studies European acquisitions in the period 1990-2013 to examine the relationship betwe...
Family ownership and control play an important role in large firms in Asia. There is a puzzle regard...
We investigate the relation between family ownership and control and firm performance across countri...
A recent stream of literature shows that family control is central in most countries of the world, b...
We examine the propensity to raise outside capital, both equity and debt, by family firms and compar...
We investigate how family ownership influences the industry-diversifying nature of M&As by listed co...
This monograph reviews 76 published empirical studies in relation to listed family corporations. Exi...
By using a unique and detailed data set on China's family firms, we investigate the effect of i...
Growth is important for the long-term success of a business. Regrettably, the impact of family influ...
This study uses a comprehensive European dataset to investigate the role of family control in corpor...