Sovereign defaults are associated with declines in defaulting countries trade. Are these declines the result of trade sanctions as the trade sanctions argument of sovereign borrowing would suggest? We devise an empirical strategy to evaluate this issue based on the idea that if trade sanctions are causing the declines, bilateral trade with creditor countries should fall more than trade with other countries. We find that this is not the case. The analysis does not yield much evidence of broader punishment strategies including a league of major creditors either. These results contradict the predictions of the trade sanctions theory of sovereign borrowing
Abstract This paper uses a difference-in-difference methodology similar to the one originally propos...
We propose a novel theory to explain why sovereigns borrow on both domestic and international market...
This paper uses a difference-in-difference methodology similar to the one originally proposed by Raj...
Sovereign defaults are associated with declines in defaulting countries trade. Are these declines th...
The ability of creditors to impose trade sanctions has been one of the workhorse arguments to explai...
This paper estimates the effect of sovereign debt renegotiation on international trade. Sovereign de...
Using an augmented gravity model of trade and a new database of nearly 9,000 bilateral trade pairs, ...
This paper studies from an empirical point of view if countries that default or restructure their fo...
Why would a sovereign government, immune from bankruptcy procedures and with few assets that could b...
Conventional wisdom views the problem of sovereign risk as one of insufficient penalties. Foreign cr...
Sanctions induce political instability. We present a model where sanctioned regimes may decide to re...
Many analysts argue that trade sanctions are ineffective because they generate incentives for evasio...
Abstract. This paper investigates frictions in the international nancial and goods markets and asses...
This paper estimates the effect of sovereign debt renegotiation on international trade. Sovereign de...
Economic policy makers sometimes perceive a sovereign default as a jump into the unkown. The main pi...
Abstract This paper uses a difference-in-difference methodology similar to the one originally propos...
We propose a novel theory to explain why sovereigns borrow on both domestic and international market...
This paper uses a difference-in-difference methodology similar to the one originally proposed by Raj...
Sovereign defaults are associated with declines in defaulting countries trade. Are these declines th...
The ability of creditors to impose trade sanctions has been one of the workhorse arguments to explai...
This paper estimates the effect of sovereign debt renegotiation on international trade. Sovereign de...
Using an augmented gravity model of trade and a new database of nearly 9,000 bilateral trade pairs, ...
This paper studies from an empirical point of view if countries that default or restructure their fo...
Why would a sovereign government, immune from bankruptcy procedures and with few assets that could b...
Conventional wisdom views the problem of sovereign risk as one of insufficient penalties. Foreign cr...
Sanctions induce political instability. We present a model where sanctioned regimes may decide to re...
Many analysts argue that trade sanctions are ineffective because they generate incentives for evasio...
Abstract. This paper investigates frictions in the international nancial and goods markets and asses...
This paper estimates the effect of sovereign debt renegotiation on international trade. Sovereign de...
Economic policy makers sometimes perceive a sovereign default as a jump into the unkown. The main pi...
Abstract This paper uses a difference-in-difference methodology similar to the one originally propos...
We propose a novel theory to explain why sovereigns borrow on both domestic and international market...
This paper uses a difference-in-difference methodology similar to the one originally proposed by Raj...