This Article argues that the principle relied upon in King v. Burwell that courts cannot interpret statutes to negate their stated purposes -the enacted purposes canon-is and should be viewed as a bedrock element of statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court has relied upon this principle for decades, but it has done so in ways that do not call attention to this interpretive choice. As a result, the scope and patterns of the Court\u27s reliance are easy to miss. After reconstructing the Court\u27s practice, this Article defends this principle of interpretation on analytic, normative, and pragmatic grounds. Building on jurisprudence showing that when a rule states its own justification the meaning of the rule changes, this Article argues t...
Scholars have long debated the merits of various theories for interpreting statutes. On one side, t...
An aspect of the battle over deconstruction is whether resort to legislative intent might help to de...
This Essay christens a new canon into the doctrines of statutory interpretation, one that can counte...
In this article, we consider the impact of positive political theory on legislative interpretation a...
With three recent decisions—Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, King v. Burwell, and Michigan v. EP...
This Article demonstrates that textualist Judges, most notably Justices Scalia, Thomas, and, to a le...
The much-maligned canons of statutory construction stubbornly have survived, largely on the strength...
Federal courts have long employed substantive canons of construction in the interpretation of statut...
Interpretive methodology lies at the core of the Supreme Court\u27s persistent modern debate about s...
Daniel Farber\u27 and Stephen Ross, in separate contributions to this Symposium, raise the most cruc...
This Article provides the first empirical study of the Roberts Court\u27s use of substantive canons ...
In resolving questions of statutory meaning, the lion’s share of Roberts Court opinions considers an...
Although a maxim of statutory drafting is to identify the relevant audience and draft so that the au...
What motivates substantive presumptions about how to interpret statutes? Are they like statistical h...
This Symposium has its genesis in the Vanderbilt Law Review\u27s inaugural symposium, A Symposium on...
Scholars have long debated the merits of various theories for interpreting statutes. On one side, t...
An aspect of the battle over deconstruction is whether resort to legislative intent might help to de...
This Essay christens a new canon into the doctrines of statutory interpretation, one that can counte...
In this article, we consider the impact of positive political theory on legislative interpretation a...
With three recent decisions—Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, King v. Burwell, and Michigan v. EP...
This Article demonstrates that textualist Judges, most notably Justices Scalia, Thomas, and, to a le...
The much-maligned canons of statutory construction stubbornly have survived, largely on the strength...
Federal courts have long employed substantive canons of construction in the interpretation of statut...
Interpretive methodology lies at the core of the Supreme Court\u27s persistent modern debate about s...
Daniel Farber\u27 and Stephen Ross, in separate contributions to this Symposium, raise the most cruc...
This Article provides the first empirical study of the Roberts Court\u27s use of substantive canons ...
In resolving questions of statutory meaning, the lion’s share of Roberts Court opinions considers an...
Although a maxim of statutory drafting is to identify the relevant audience and draft so that the au...
What motivates substantive presumptions about how to interpret statutes? Are they like statistical h...
This Symposium has its genesis in the Vanderbilt Law Review\u27s inaugural symposium, A Symposium on...
Scholars have long debated the merits of various theories for interpreting statutes. On one side, t...
An aspect of the battle over deconstruction is whether resort to legislative intent might help to de...
This Essay christens a new canon into the doctrines of statutory interpretation, one that can counte...