Add to ORKGIn this thesis, I try to spell out what it is to be a human agent. I start by defending an account of agency which I call the cognitive account. The cognitive account of agency holds that there are certain mental capabilities that are required to determine what is an action of the agent and what is not. This then leads into a discussion of intentionality, where I defend a functionalist account of intentional realism. After this I discuss how actions and events are individuated leading into a discussion of what it is to do something intentionally. This relies heavily on the role of act plans, which I believe are better represented by the componential view of actions that I defend earlier
242 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1983.This thesis attempts to show ...
Humans and other animals are intentional agents; they are capable of acting in ways that are caused ...
Although we perform many of our actions without much consciousness of these, occasionally we are exp...
In this thesis, I try to spell out what it is to be a human agent. I start by defending an account o...
Generally speaking, the present literature on agency has been heavily focused on human agency. This ...
I develop an interdisciplinary framework for understanding the nature of agents and agency that is c...
Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processe...
The main focus of this thesis is the conscious experience that attends the actions that we perform a...
Some authors in philosophy of mind have sought to defend a theory according to which cognitive proce...
The central concern of this thesis is to begin to explicate the concepts of action and agency. I co...
This thesis recognises two axioms of materialism. Firstly, that the human or other agent is within a...
We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that standard accounts of i...
Well-functioning agents ordinarily have an excellent epistemic relationship to their intentional act...
Following the levels of intentionality and semiosis distinguished by the Semiotic Hierarchy (a layer...
My dissertation addresses a foundational problem in the philosophy of action, that of explaining the...
242 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1983.This thesis attempts to show ...
Humans and other animals are intentional agents; they are capable of acting in ways that are caused ...
Although we perform many of our actions without much consciousness of these, occasionally we are exp...
In this thesis, I try to spell out what it is to be a human agent. I start by defending an account o...
Generally speaking, the present literature on agency has been heavily focused on human agency. This ...
I develop an interdisciplinary framework for understanding the nature of agents and agency that is c...
Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processe...
The main focus of this thesis is the conscious experience that attends the actions that we perform a...
Some authors in philosophy of mind have sought to defend a theory according to which cognitive proce...
The central concern of this thesis is to begin to explicate the concepts of action and agency. I co...
This thesis recognises two axioms of materialism. Firstly, that the human or other agent is within a...
We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that standard accounts of i...
Well-functioning agents ordinarily have an excellent epistemic relationship to their intentional act...
Following the levels of intentionality and semiosis distinguished by the Semiotic Hierarchy (a layer...
My dissertation addresses a foundational problem in the philosophy of action, that of explaining the...
242 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1983.This thesis attempts to show ...
Humans and other animals are intentional agents; they are capable of acting in ways that are caused ...
Although we perform many of our actions without much consciousness of these, occasionally we are exp...