On descriptive reference fixing

Among the many morals one could draw from direct reference is that there is a gulf between general and singular thoughts (or between what we might call “satisfaction-based thoughts” and “reference-based thoughts”). In addition, proper names are special because, qua proper names, they can only be used (in their typical uses) to express singular thoughts. The idea is that there is something in the nature of naming that grounds this connection between names and singular thoughts. A consequence of this picture is that attributive uses of definite descriptions and typical uses of names are associated with completely different kinds of thoughts and this is, basically, the reason why a psycho-semantical analysis of proper names cannot be given in descriptive terms. Within this picture, descriptively introduced names should be banned or, at least, taken as a ‘deviant’ phenomenon. In this paper, I want to show that the practice of introducing names by descriptive reference fixing is actually quite mysterious and at risk of generating strange results. In particular, I will show that tentative tamings of such a practice are not working, either because they would be helpless in problematic cases or because they would be so strong as to exclude (what are standardly taken as) non-problematic cases of descriptive name introductions