Building African Solutions to American Problems US Security Assistance to the African Union Mission in Somalia (2001-2016)

Since the end of the Cold War, security assistance has remained a prominent feature of US foreign policy in Africa. While during the 1990s Washington’s rationale behind such assistance revolved around supporting African-led peacekeeping initiatives, since September 11, 2001, counter-terrorism emerged as the dominant framework for US security engagement on the continent. In this context, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) stands out. After its establishment in 2007, AMISOM, an African-operated multinational peace operation, became both the foremost global recipient of US peacekeeping-focused security assistance, and a core pillar of the US counter-terrorism strategy in the Horn of Africa. In this thesis, I account for why this was the case through an investigation of US security assistance to AMISOM between 2001 and 2016. This analysis draws on a wide range of primary sources, including unclassified documentation from the US Department of State and Department of Defense, United Nations and African Union, as well as leaked diplomatic cables. The pattern of US security assistance to AMISOM and participating African states during this time period indicates that the US intended to ‘buy’ African commitments to the mission in order to further US counter-terrorism objectives in Somalia. Embedding this effort within a multilateral peacekeeping framework, Washington was able to somewhat coordinate the activities of its African partners, and to provide a broad set of incentives and a legitimising narrative for both US and African involvement in the operation. However, conditions in Somalia and a lack of viable alternatives meant that AMISOM quickly became essential to Washington’s efforts, in turn providing African states with significant leverage over the US. Ultimately, the inclusion of Kenya and Ethiopia in AMISOM after 2012 highlighted the tensions between maintaining the legitimising effect of the mission and achieving counterterrorism goals, as the US had few choices but to accept and support less-than-ideal partners. These findings suggest that the flow of US security assistance to AMISOM did not directly reflect US intentions, but was the product of broader factors, including African resistance to perceived US neo-imperialism, as well as the dependency of Washington on its African counter-terrorism partners. Moreover, these findings have relevance for broader research on US security assistance, suggesting that the context framing its provision may indicate a different intent than suggested by declared programme goals