Agency problems between corporate managers and financiers/banks are common issues in corporate governance literature. In this paper we try to reduce the moral hazards problem of corporate managers’ profit misreporting as an agency problem in Profit and loss sharing contracts (PLS). To minimize this risk, we propose that the financier/bank sell a real option to the corporate manager giving her the right to gradually own the corporation. Since the share of the financier diminishes periodically we refer to this mode as diminishing PLS. We use a repeated game theoretical approach by combining diminishing PLS with real options. To test our model, we code a program in Netlogo to create an agent-based simulation environment where we compa...
We present a model of a firm facing a dynamic moral hazard problem in which the firm has also has ac...
In the first chapter, Option-like Contracts for Innovation and Production, we model how firms motiva...
To avoid the extremely high profit levels found in recent experience of public utilities' regulation...
Profit and Loss Sharing contracts (PLS) are forms of financing where profits are shared according to...
In this paper , we apply game theory to corporate financing using profit and loss sharing (PLS) con...
This article aims to use a bargaining power model to reduce moral hazard—in the form of entrepreneur...
In profit and loss sharing contracts, profits are shared according to a specific ratio while losses...
In a bilateral moral hazard framework, where the principal is also a productive agent, the requireme...
This article aims to use a bargaining power model to reduce moral hazard—in the form of entrepreneur...
The aim is to investigate the difference in the functional dependence between incentives based on ou...
The two major paradigms in the theoretical agency literature are moral hazard (i.e., hidden action) ...
In this paper, we examine a firm's choice of operating leverage in a principal-agent setting and fin...
In this paper two models are contrasted whereby a corporation is seeking to finance the purchase of ...
In a bilateral moral hazard framework, where the principal is also a productive agent, the requireme...
PLS contracts in Islamic finance are fair economic practices as they focus on sharing profits and lo...
We present a model of a firm facing a dynamic moral hazard problem in which the firm has also has ac...
In the first chapter, Option-like Contracts for Innovation and Production, we model how firms motiva...
To avoid the extremely high profit levels found in recent experience of public utilities' regulation...
Profit and Loss Sharing contracts (PLS) are forms of financing where profits are shared according to...
In this paper , we apply game theory to corporate financing using profit and loss sharing (PLS) con...
This article aims to use a bargaining power model to reduce moral hazard—in the form of entrepreneur...
In profit and loss sharing contracts, profits are shared according to a specific ratio while losses...
In a bilateral moral hazard framework, where the principal is also a productive agent, the requireme...
This article aims to use a bargaining power model to reduce moral hazard—in the form of entrepreneur...
The aim is to investigate the difference in the functional dependence between incentives based on ou...
The two major paradigms in the theoretical agency literature are moral hazard (i.e., hidden action) ...
In this paper, we examine a firm's choice of operating leverage in a principal-agent setting and fin...
In this paper two models are contrasted whereby a corporation is seeking to finance the purchase of ...
In a bilateral moral hazard framework, where the principal is also a productive agent, the requireme...
PLS contracts in Islamic finance are fair economic practices as they focus on sharing profits and lo...
We present a model of a firm facing a dynamic moral hazard problem in which the firm has also has ac...
In the first chapter, Option-like Contracts for Innovation and Production, we model how firms motiva...
To avoid the extremely high profit levels found in recent experience of public utilities' regulation...