Victory: the Triumph and Tragedy of Just War

Victory has historically been regarded as the ‘telos’ or ‘very object’ of war. As one well-placed commentator has noted, war is all about winning. It is baffling to note, then, that contemporary just war theory, the predominant framework for addressing the moral and legal questions that war raises, does not engage the discourse of victory. Today’s just war theorists shun the language of victory, preferring instead to speak about the ‘endings’ of warfare. This book investigates why just war theorists have been so reluctant to speak about victory. It identifies seven principal objections to invoking victory in just war theory and subjects them to cross-examination. It concludes that while there are good reasons for regarding victory as a problematic concept, these same reasons could (and arguably should) be taken as an argument for embracing rather than ignoring victory within the just war framework. Such a move would not only spare just war theory of the charge of irrelevance by ensuring that it remains connected to the pointy end of warfare, it would also illuminate the tragic character of just war itself, revealing both its necessity and limitations