Can Fictionalists Have Faith?

This article has been published in a revised form in Religioius Studies, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412517000063. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © 2016 Cambridge University Press.According to non-doxastic theories of propositional faith, belief that p is not necessary for faith that p. Rather, propositional faith merely requires a 'positive cognitive attitude'. This broad condition, however, can be satisfied by several pragmatic approaches to a domain, including fictionalism. This article shows precisely how fictionalists can have faith given non-doxastic theory, and explains why this is problematic. It then explores one means of separating the two theories, in virtue of the fact that the truth of the propositions in a discourse is of little consequence for fictionalists, whereas their truth matters deeply for the faithful. Although promising, this approach incurs several theoretical costs, hence providing a compelling reason to favour a purely doxastic account of faith.Peer reviewe