Add to ORKGNicholas Shea offers Varitel Semantics as a naturalistic account of mental content. I argue that the account secures determinate content only by appeal to pragmatic considerations, and so it fails to respect naturalism. But that is fine, because representational content is not, strictly speaking, necessary for explanation in cognitive science. Even in Shea’s own account, content serves only a variety of heuristic functions
Much of the contemporary research in cognitive psychology presupposes an information processing or c...
Much of computational cognitive science construes human cognitive capacities as representational ...
In this paper, I argue that even if the Hard Problem of Content, as identified by Hutto and Myin, is...
Nicholas Shea offers Varitel Semantics as a naturalistic account of mental content. I argue that the...
In their constructive reviews, Frances Egan, Randy Gallistel and Steven Gross have raised some impo...
This is a comment on Frances Egan's paper, "How to Think About Mental Content." Egan distinguishes m...
In the literature on the nature and role of cognitive representation, three positions are taken acro...
Against Stich\u27s recommendation that we purge cognitive psychology of content I argue that ascript...
This paper sets out a view about the explanatory role of representational content and advocates one ...
This paper sets out a view about the explanatory role of representational content and advocates one ...
How can we think about things in the outside world? There is still no widely accepted theory of how ...
The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) holds that cognitive processes are essentially computational,...
It is a rare privilege to have such eminent and insightful reviewers. Their kind words about the boo...
In the literature on enactive approaches to cognition, representationalism is often seen as a rival ...
Much of the contemporary research in cognitive psychology presupposes an information processing or c...
Much of computational cognitive science construes human cognitive capacities as representational ...
In this paper, I argue that even if the Hard Problem of Content, as identified by Hutto and Myin, is...
Nicholas Shea offers Varitel Semantics as a naturalistic account of mental content. I argue that the...
In their constructive reviews, Frances Egan, Randy Gallistel and Steven Gross have raised some impo...
This is a comment on Frances Egan's paper, "How to Think About Mental Content." Egan distinguishes m...
In the literature on the nature and role of cognitive representation, three positions are taken acro...
Against Stich\u27s recommendation that we purge cognitive psychology of content I argue that ascript...
This paper sets out a view about the explanatory role of representational content and advocates one ...
This paper sets out a view about the explanatory role of representational content and advocates one ...
How can we think about things in the outside world? There is still no widely accepted theory of how ...
The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) holds that cognitive processes are essentially computational,...
It is a rare privilege to have such eminent and insightful reviewers. Their kind words about the boo...
In the literature on enactive approaches to cognition, representationalism is often seen as a rival ...
Much of the contemporary research in cognitive psychology presupposes an information processing or c...
Much of computational cognitive science construes human cognitive capacities as representational ...
In this paper, I argue that even if the Hard Problem of Content, as identified by Hutto and Myin, is...