Combating terrorism : opportunities to improve domestic preparedness program focus and efficiency

818283PDFResearch PaperGAO/NSIAD-99-3TerrorismCountermeasuresBiological materialsChemical agentsCoordinationDesignEquipmentEquipment maintenanceInteragency relationsUnited States. General Accounting OfficeUnited States. Government Accountability OfficeNTL-AVIATION-Aviation Safety/AirworthinessNTL-INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS-INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMSNTL-SAFETY AND SECURITY-Transit Safety and SecurityUS Transportation CollectionConcerned that terrorists might move beyond using conventional weapons to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear devices - Congress authorized the federal government to improve capabilities to respond to such incidents, particularly at the local level. The General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to review the status and other aspects of the Domestic Preparedness Program, a training, assistance, and equipment load program led by the Department of Defense (DOD). Specifically, they evaluated (1) the training and other benefits offered to cities under the Domestic Preparedness Program and (2) the methodology for designing and implementing the program, including the way in which cities were selected to participate, how cities' capabilities and needs were assessed, and the effectiveness of interagency coordination on this and other similar consequence management training and equipment programs. Briefly, the training and equipment that DOD is providing to cities through the Domestic Preparedness Program have clearly increased cities' awareness of and should better prepare them to deal with a potential chemical or biological terrorist incident. In designing the training and equipment program, DOD selected 120 cities based solely on city population. This decision resulted in 14 clusters of 44 cities within 30 miles of at least 1 other city selected. DOD's loan of equipment in support of the training program has caused frustration and confusion among local officials. The legislation authorizing DOD to lend equipment restricts the use of the equipment to training and requires the cities to repair, maintain, and replace the equipment, even though DOD program officials intend for the loans to be permanent and will allow the use of equipment for operational purposes. The interagency coordination process provided a valuable information-sharing forum but was of limited success in helping steer the design and development of the program. Federal agencies' individual efforts to enhance consequence management of possible incidents involving WMD terrorism are not guided by an overarching strategy for achieving a defined end state