The Taiwan Question: reconciling the irreconcilable

For twenty years the issue of Taiwan defined Sino-Japanese relations. All interaction between Japan and China – political, economic or social – had to be understood and mediated through the fact of Japan’s formal diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China (on Taiwan) rather than the People’s Republic. Surveying the twenty-eight years that have passed since the Japanese government switched recognition, perhaps the most remarkable thing is how little Taiwan has been a source of conflict. The three governments involved have proved adept at managing the relationship and all three have shown a willingness to accommodate and compromise for their mutual benefit. The key to enabling the relationship has been the ability of Japan and Taiwan to utilise informal channels and networks to handle contact and communication, and the willingness of the PRC to tolerate this. However, although Beijing and Tokyo have shown a significant willingness to compromise and accommodate one another over the Taiwan question, the CCP has a bottom line over which it cannot compromise: the leadership of the PRC is unwilling, and perhaps unable, to tolerate any change in the Japanese government’s stance on the formal ‘oneChina policy’. This dictates that Japan must never assign any form of sovereignty to Taiwan, it must ensure that all contacts are informal/unofficial (or at least lowprofile) and that issues related to reunification are a matter solely for Beijing and Taipei. Furthermore, changes in the international system related to globalisation mean that the space in which informal ties exist is becoming increasingly codified and formalised, which puts growing pressure on the informal channels