Universals, Occam\u27s Razor, and the Strong Minimalist Thesis

The main purpose of this article is to explore consequences of Chomsky\u27s (2000, 2001a,b) strong minimalist thesis (SMT) as it pertains to evolution of language, the form and functioning of FL (the faculty of language), the dichotomy between methodological and ontological minimalism in the sense of Martin and Uriagereka (2000) (i.e., Occam\u27s razor vs. the SMT), substantive and formal universals in the sense of Chomsky (1965), and the choice between Chomsky\u27s (2000, 2001a,b) \u27phase-wise\u27 implementation of multiple spell-out and Epstein and Seely\u27s (1999, 2002) \u27application-wise\u27 implementation of it. As for narrow syntax, all its descriptive vocabulary is shown to derive from interface conditions (IC) whereas its functioning largely derives from mathematical properties, the mathematical being assumed to be ubiquitous in the natural world (hence, in language as well). This scenario will be seen to lead to the situation required by Chomsky\u27s (2001b: 3) extremely strong minimalist thesis SMT where the category of "unexplained elements of So" is nonexistent. It will also be argued on the basis of conceptual considerations originating with some bioscience and sociology literature that the concept of \u27thickness\u27 required by human recognition may play a role in distinguishing between otherwise almost indistinguishable two ways of implementing multiple spell-out