Doctor of Philosophy

dissertationExpressing anger in negotiation can elicit concessions from one's counterpart, often because angry negotiators are perceived as "tough." However, "toughness" has been defined as both "having tough negotiation limits" and "behaving in threatening or dominating ways." This dissertation explores anger intensity variation to demonstrate the circumstances under which angry negotiators are perceived as having tough limits, versus when they are perceived as threatening, and when their counterparts are inclined to respond with reciprocal anger. Study 1 demonstrates that low- and medium-intensity anger elicit greater concessions than no- or high-anger conditions and that this effect is mediated by perceptions of threat. I also test in Study 2 the effects of anger intensity on Pareto efficiency in an integrative, dyadic negotiation. However, hypotheses about these effects were not supported. I discuss possible design factors that contributed to the null results, as well as future directions for this area of research. The paper contributes to emotion and negotiation theory by distinguishing clearly between threat and tracking (previously both referred to as "toughness") and measuring them simultaneously, as well as by conducting the first study of anger intensity's effect on integrative negotiation outcomes