Corrupt Political Leaders and the Failures of the Institutional Checks

Abstract: This paper focuses on the efficiency of institutional check and balances in counteracting corrupt leaders. Particularly, the analysis addresses the corruption of Italian mayors, and it relies on the sentences of the Supreme Court in the last decade. We estimate i) the likelihood of the occurrence of the civil action in the criminal proceedings ii) the likelihood of the Mayors’ re-election when involved in a corruption case, as a form of social control of the corrupt leader. The results reported here reveal that the probabilities of the civil action decrease when the Mayor has a long political career, when the corruption is based on an ongoing criminal collaboration, especially when it involved mafia-groups, and when the context shows a high social vulnerability index. On the contrary, the probabilities of the civil action increase when the corrupt mayor is an entrepreneur and the corruption involves other members of the municipality. We then compare three samples of mayors as guilty, innocent and never been tried: in all the cases the political career ageing index of population and social vulnerability index significantly increase the probability of re-election. Consistent with previous studies we confirm that actors are more likely to behave corruptly where context shape insufficient institutional countermeasures to hold that individual liable. Furthermore, we add that this is particularly true in those cases of highly corrupted leaders. Keywords