¿Unirealizabilidad?: una crítica a un modelo reduccionista reduccionista [Unirealizability? a critique of a reductionist model]

In the frame of the materialist movement “New Wave Reductionism”, in the last decade, the idea of “Ruthless Reductionism” presented by the philosopher John Bickle in his book “Philosophy and Neuroscience: a ruthlessly reductive account” (2003) had a major impact producing a wave of researches interlinking philosophy and neuroscience, which contents vary between protocols and experimental designs, causality, mechanisms and multiple realizations. This paper is intended to present John Bickle‟s model (1998, 2003, 2006) within this movement. Furthermore, it includes a review of two authors: Jaquelline Sullivan (2008, 2008) and Ken Aizawa (2007, 2008), with the purpose of examining the mentioned model and raising the main critiques that have been pointed to it. Some of these critiques refer to the nature of the investigation, setting protocol differences in the study of the same phenomenon in different labs. Further developments, make reference to the construct used in the experiments in order to support the results obtained by Bickle: Long Term Social Recognition Memory – LTSRM – together with some warnings about social recognition cues that are not the same among different organisms, as well as the components that build the main intra neural pathway of the LTSRM – AMPc – PKA – CREB among species. It‟s intended to point out how these aspects, when considering some experimental bias and mistakes in the reading of the LTSRM experiment, discredit the author‟s idea about the Unity Realization of Ruthlessly Reductionism.https://www.marilia.unesp.br/#!/revistas-eletronicas/filogenese/edicoes-anteriores/2011---volume-42/status: publishe