Add to ORKGThis paper identifies some simple counterexamples to Lewis's account of indeterministic causation in terms of chance and counterfactuals. It proposes a different account to handle these problems, by way of introducing a notion of 'overall world chance'
Probabilities figure centrally in much of the literature on the semantics of conditionals. I find th...
David Lewis claimed that deterministic chance was impossible. But deterministic chance seems ubiquit...
This dissertation explores the notion of objective chance as reasonable degree of belief given what ...
This paper attempts to resolve certain problems for David Lewis's counterfactual account of indeterm...
On David Lewis's original analysis of causation, c causes e only if c is linked to e by a chain of d...
I develop an account of counterfactual conditionals using “causal models”, and argue that this accou...
This well-edited volume contains essays of considerable ingenuity on a difficult subject, the analys...
Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' thin...
Lewis's counterfactual analysis of causation starts with the claim that c causes e if ~ C > ~ E, whe...
This article focuses on David Lewis’s theory of causation. The author provides helpful clarity regar...
In this paper I consider possible causation, specifically, would-cause counterfactuals of the form ‘...
Hume's second definition of causation described effects as being counterfactually dependent upon th...
It is near-consensus among those currently working on the semantics of counterfactuals that the corr...
In ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance, ’ David Lewis says that he is “led to wonder whether...
It is argued that an analysis of causation using counterfactual conditionals can be given. Causes an...
Probabilities figure centrally in much of the literature on the semantics of conditionals. I find th...
David Lewis claimed that deterministic chance was impossible. But deterministic chance seems ubiquit...
This dissertation explores the notion of objective chance as reasonable degree of belief given what ...
This paper attempts to resolve certain problems for David Lewis's counterfactual account of indeterm...
On David Lewis's original analysis of causation, c causes e only if c is linked to e by a chain of d...
I develop an account of counterfactual conditionals using “causal models”, and argue that this accou...
This well-edited volume contains essays of considerable ingenuity on a difficult subject, the analys...
Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' thin...
Lewis's counterfactual analysis of causation starts with the claim that c causes e if ~ C > ~ E, whe...
This article focuses on David Lewis’s theory of causation. The author provides helpful clarity regar...
In this paper I consider possible causation, specifically, would-cause counterfactuals of the form ‘...
Hume's second definition of causation described effects as being counterfactually dependent upon th...
It is near-consensus among those currently working on the semantics of counterfactuals that the corr...
In ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance, ’ David Lewis says that he is “led to wonder whether...
It is argued that an analysis of causation using counterfactual conditionals can be given. Causes an...
Probabilities figure centrally in much of the literature on the semantics of conditionals. I find th...
David Lewis claimed that deterministic chance was impossible. But deterministic chance seems ubiquit...
This dissertation explores the notion of objective chance as reasonable degree of belief given what ...