Kant’s transcendentalism as a transcendental paradigm of philosophizing

This paper considers Kant’s transcendental philosophy as a special transcendental paradigm (a special type of philosophical research) differing from both the "objective" metaphysics of Antiquity and the "subjective" metaphysics of Modernity (the metaphysics of an object (transcendent metaphysics; meta—physics) — experience (transcendental metaphysics) — the metaphysics of the subject (immanent metaphysics; meta—psychology)). For this purpose, the author introduces suchnew methodological concepts as “transcendental shift” and “transcendental perspective” (see CPR, B25) and “transcendental constructivism” or “pragmatism” (see “acts of pure thinking" (CPR, B81)). This interpretation of transcendentalism is based on the cognitive-semantic reading of the Critique in the light of Kant’s question formulated in a letter to M. Herz (of February 21, 1772): “What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call “representation” to the object?” (R. Hanna) and the modern interpretation of Kant that was called the “two aspects” interpretation (H. Allison). Whereas classical metaphysics interprets knowledge as a relation between the (empirical) subject and the object, the transcendental metaphysics understands "possible experience”(Erfahrung) as a relation between the transcendental subject (transcendental unity of apperception) and the transcendental object. At the same time, unlike contemplative classical metaphysics, Kant’s transcendentalism is an "experimental" metaphysics, whereas the “transcendental” is defined as a borderline ontological area between the immanent and the transcendent, an “instrumental” element of our cognition and consciousness (cf. E. Husserl’s intentional reality andK. Popper’s three worlds)