In this article, we discuss how donor and recipient characteristics affected the incidence and timing of political action committee (PAC) contributions to incumbent members of the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1993–94 election cycle. We contribute to the campaign finance literature by modeling the timing of contributions, which is important because timing affects the perception of political actors about the competitiveness of elections and the loci of power among members of Congress, interest groups, and between members of Congress and interest groups. Splitpopulation event history models allow us to compare and contrast determinants of whether and when contributions are made across various types and sizes of PACs
In contrast to conventional studies on campaign finance, which focus on the aggregate effect of mone...
Campaign contributions are a staple of congressional life. Yet, the search for tangible effects of c...
Many members of Congress now play an active role in financing the elections of their colleagues, but...
There has been much discussion about how members of Congress desire money early in the campaign seas...
Party leaders face a significant tradeoff financing races when the party is out of power: while they...
In this research we hypothesize that aggregate PAC behavior is conditional in nature. PACs in a spec...
Objectives Contributions to candidates from the parties’ congressional campaign committees are thoug...
Traditionally, observers have characterized leadership political action committees (LPACs) as tools ...
Why do political action committees (PACs) donate money to some candidates and not others? Answers t...
Political scientists have long tried to explain how interest group lobbying and political action com...
Traditionally, observers have characterized leadership political action committees (LPACs) as tools ...
Concern that donations to political campaigns can help political actors secure preferential treatmen...
Laurence SeidmanThis thesis examines the relationship between Political Action Committee donations a...
A great deal of research focuses on contributions by political action com-mittees (PACs) to candidat...
Individuals are the single largest source of campaign contributions, yet we know little about their ...
In contrast to conventional studies on campaign finance, which focus on the aggregate effect of mone...
Campaign contributions are a staple of congressional life. Yet, the search for tangible effects of c...
Many members of Congress now play an active role in financing the elections of their colleagues, but...
There has been much discussion about how members of Congress desire money early in the campaign seas...
Party leaders face a significant tradeoff financing races when the party is out of power: while they...
In this research we hypothesize that aggregate PAC behavior is conditional in nature. PACs in a spec...
Objectives Contributions to candidates from the parties’ congressional campaign committees are thoug...
Traditionally, observers have characterized leadership political action committees (LPACs) as tools ...
Why do political action committees (PACs) donate money to some candidates and not others? Answers t...
Political scientists have long tried to explain how interest group lobbying and political action com...
Traditionally, observers have characterized leadership political action committees (LPACs) as tools ...
Concern that donations to political campaigns can help political actors secure preferential treatmen...
Laurence SeidmanThis thesis examines the relationship between Political Action Committee donations a...
A great deal of research focuses on contributions by political action com-mittees (PACs) to candidat...
Individuals are the single largest source of campaign contributions, yet we know little about their ...
In contrast to conventional studies on campaign finance, which focus on the aggregate effect of mone...
Campaign contributions are a staple of congressional life. Yet, the search for tangible effects of c...
Many members of Congress now play an active role in financing the elections of their colleagues, but...