Replication Data for: Partisan Competition and the Efficiency of Lawmaking in American Legislatures, 1991-2009

Does partisan competition explain why some legislatures are more efficient at processing legislation than others? This article argues that legislative parties’ strategic incentives and capabilities are a function of their size, their ideological homogeneity, and the governor’s party. It shows that the distribution of legislative seats between the parties influences legislative efficiency, depending on the level of polarization between the parties and the party of the governor. A small partisan seat margin reduces legislative efficiency when the parties are polarized and when the government is divided. It provides further evidence that polarization and divided government can either positively or negatively affect legislative efficiency, depending on the distribution of seats held between the two parties. This research contributes to the literature by demonstrating the conditional influence of political parties. Based in multilevel modeling techniques, this research also contributes to the literature with robust evidence including 48 state legislatures, through 19 years