How does district magnitude affect electoral outcomes? This paper addresses this question by exploiting a combination of two natural experiments in Argentina between 1985 and 2015. Argentine provinces elect half of their congressional delegation every two years, and thus districts with an odd number of representatives have varying magnitudes in different election years. Furthermore, whether a province elects more representatives in midterm or concurrent years was decided by lottery in 1983. The results indicate that district magnitude (a) increases electoral support for small parties, (b) increases the (effective) number of parties getting seats, and (c) reduces electoral dis- proportionality. The last two results are driven by the mechanic...
First published online: 7 August 2015According to the classical perspective, polity size and democra...
Abstract: In this paper I study strategic voting behavior in the Argentine Senate election for the C...
According to the classical perspective, polity size and democracy are inversely related. In this art...
Is there more sincere voting in multi-member districts than in single-member districts? Existing res...
A ranking exists in electoral systems research of different electoral formulas—the mathematical func...
Contains fulltext : 86705.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access)Although studi...
Duverger's propositions concerning the psychological and mechanical consequences of electoral rules ...
District magnitude is a central aspect of the institutional context in PR elections, and it influenc...
District magnitude is a central aspect of the institutional context in PR elections, and it influenc...
<p></p><p>Abstract The purpose of this paper is to identify the effect of electoral district magnitu...
Previous research has that proportional-representation systems produce higher levels of government s...
Evaluating the fairness of electoral reforms is a critical requirement for electoral accountability ...
A sizable literature on electoral institutions argues that proportional electoral rules lead to high...
We develop and apply a new conceptual framework and measure for evaluating electoral systems, focusi...
We propose a comprehensive statistical model for analyzing multiparty, district-level elections. Thi...
First published online: 7 August 2015According to the classical perspective, polity size and democra...
Abstract: In this paper I study strategic voting behavior in the Argentine Senate election for the C...
According to the classical perspective, polity size and democracy are inversely related. In this art...
Is there more sincere voting in multi-member districts than in single-member districts? Existing res...
A ranking exists in electoral systems research of different electoral formulas—the mathematical func...
Contains fulltext : 86705.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access)Although studi...
Duverger's propositions concerning the psychological and mechanical consequences of electoral rules ...
District magnitude is a central aspect of the institutional context in PR elections, and it influenc...
District magnitude is a central aspect of the institutional context in PR elections, and it influenc...
<p></p><p>Abstract The purpose of this paper is to identify the effect of electoral district magnitu...
Previous research has that proportional-representation systems produce higher levels of government s...
Evaluating the fairness of electoral reforms is a critical requirement for electoral accountability ...
A sizable literature on electoral institutions argues that proportional electoral rules lead to high...
We develop and apply a new conceptual framework and measure for evaluating electoral systems, focusi...
We propose a comprehensive statistical model for analyzing multiparty, district-level elections. Thi...
First published online: 7 August 2015According to the classical perspective, polity size and democra...
Abstract: In this paper I study strategic voting behavior in the Argentine Senate election for the C...
According to the classical perspective, polity size and democracy are inversely related. In this art...