Transnational Climate Governance Networks and Domestic Regulatory Action

Transnational climate governance (TCG) creates networks between countries as governments and other organizations enter joint arrangements to further their interests. We argue that actors build TCG, rather than focusing on promoting change at the domestic level, when this is a more efficient way of using their limited resources than lobbying to increase the level of domestic regulation. Based on standard microeconomic theory, we show that actors will respond to higher existing levels of domestic regulation by participating more in TCG because the existence of such domestic legislation frees up resources for them to use in other ways, including activities at the transnational level. We carry out an empirical test based on the strength of the network ties between countries formed by TCG. Results support our main hypothesis on the positive relationship between a country’s level of domestic policy output and its participation in TCGs, suggesting that national policies and TCGs are more complements than substitutes as instruments to address global climate change