A generalized distrust in Mexican local elections raises the question of whether electoral corruption has vanished or remains a prevalent practice in the country. To answer this question, I analyze the 2010 gubernatorial elections, exploiting a feature of the country’s electoral system: within each electoral precinct, voters are assigned to polling stations according to their childhood surname. Consequently, the only difference between voters in contiguous polling stations should be their last names. Given that political preferences are seldom correlated with voters’ names, I use suspicious differences in turnout levels across contiguous polling stations to identify fraudulent practices. The findings of this paper indicate that nondemocrati...
We investigate the relationship between political networks, weak institutions, and election fraud du...
The 2018 Mexican election was the largest in the country’s history, with more than 3,400 legislative...
Abstract: We show that higher-office election incentives affec mayoral corruption levels. Using mea...
Mexico’s history of corrupt elections throughout the 20th century casts a long shadow. Determining w...
This paper investigates the incentives and opportunities for non-democratic regimes to rely on fraud...
This dissertation concerns the ways to detect electoral manipulation, even when we are not able to r...
How do parties protect themselves from electoral manipulation? To answer this question, we study the...
Weak electoral registration requirements are commonly thought to encourage electoral participation, ...
Mexico has a chequered history when it comes to elections, with its electoral integrity occasionally...
I use data from the 2006 federal election in Mexico to compare the impression conveyed by tests base...
This study explores how citizens in a newly democratized country with a legacy of electoral fraud an...
Nowadays, a large number of countries combine formal democratic institutions with authoritarian prac...
Studies of clientelism typically assume that political machines distribute rewards to persuade or mo...
This study explores how citizens in a newly democratized country with a legacy of electoral fraud an...
Electoral accountability rests on voters re-electing high-performing and removing low-performing inc...
We investigate the relationship between political networks, weak institutions, and election fraud du...
The 2018 Mexican election was the largest in the country’s history, with more than 3,400 legislative...
Abstract: We show that higher-office election incentives affec mayoral corruption levels. Using mea...
Mexico’s history of corrupt elections throughout the 20th century casts a long shadow. Determining w...
This paper investigates the incentives and opportunities for non-democratic regimes to rely on fraud...
This dissertation concerns the ways to detect electoral manipulation, even when we are not able to r...
How do parties protect themselves from electoral manipulation? To answer this question, we study the...
Weak electoral registration requirements are commonly thought to encourage electoral participation, ...
Mexico has a chequered history when it comes to elections, with its electoral integrity occasionally...
I use data from the 2006 federal election in Mexico to compare the impression conveyed by tests base...
This study explores how citizens in a newly democratized country with a legacy of electoral fraud an...
Nowadays, a large number of countries combine formal democratic institutions with authoritarian prac...
Studies of clientelism typically assume that political machines distribute rewards to persuade or mo...
This study explores how citizens in a newly democratized country with a legacy of electoral fraud an...
Electoral accountability rests on voters re-electing high-performing and removing low-performing inc...
We investigate the relationship between political networks, weak institutions, and election fraud du...
The 2018 Mexican election was the largest in the country’s history, with more than 3,400 legislative...
Abstract: We show that higher-office election incentives affec mayoral corruption levels. Using mea...