I investigate appointment to the Court of Appeal and House of Lords between 1880 and 2005. Exploiting the fact that appointment is almost invariably from within the ranks of existing High Court judges and using a conditional logit model, I test for effects of legal, professional, and political factors on appointment prospects. Although there is no advantage to having the same political affiliation as the appointing lord chancellor, judges are more likely to be promoted if they were previously appointed by the incumbent party
We introduce a new data set recording the vote of every Justice in 18,812 Supreme Court cases decide...
We examine whether Justices appointed to the High Court of Australia are more likely to find in favo...
Conventional wisdom holds that appointed judges are superior to elected judges because appointed jud...
Most empirical examinations of hierarchical interactions among the courts are limited to a single ju...
Policy-sensitive models of judicial behaviour, whether attitudinal or strategic, have largely passed...
Tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be indifferent to the concerns of the e...
In light of concerns that politics, philosophy, and ideology now dominate the federal judicial appoi...
Tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be insulated from political pressure an...
We examine whether circuit court judges sacrifice policy purity for career goals. We compare the beh...
Tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be indifferent to the concerns of the e...
This paper uses judicial citation practice to investigate the determinants of judicial mfluence in t...
Research indicates that senators evaluate U.S. Supreme Court nominations on two ideological dimensio...
Conventional wisdom holds that appointed judges are superior to elected judges because appointed jud...
Conventional wisdom confers iconic status on the clause of England’s Act of Settlement (1701) mandat...
Why do societies choose particular institutions of judicial selection and retention? Why do they for...
We introduce a new data set recording the vote of every Justice in 18,812 Supreme Court cases decide...
We examine whether Justices appointed to the High Court of Australia are more likely to find in favo...
Conventional wisdom holds that appointed judges are superior to elected judges because appointed jud...
Most empirical examinations of hierarchical interactions among the courts are limited to a single ju...
Policy-sensitive models of judicial behaviour, whether attitudinal or strategic, have largely passed...
Tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be indifferent to the concerns of the e...
In light of concerns that politics, philosophy, and ideology now dominate the federal judicial appoi...
Tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be insulated from political pressure an...
We examine whether circuit court judges sacrifice policy purity for career goals. We compare the beh...
Tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be indifferent to the concerns of the e...
This paper uses judicial citation practice to investigate the determinants of judicial mfluence in t...
Research indicates that senators evaluate U.S. Supreme Court nominations on two ideological dimensio...
Conventional wisdom holds that appointed judges are superior to elected judges because appointed jud...
Conventional wisdom confers iconic status on the clause of England’s Act of Settlement (1701) mandat...
Why do societies choose particular institutions of judicial selection and retention? Why do they for...
We introduce a new data set recording the vote of every Justice in 18,812 Supreme Court cases decide...
We examine whether Justices appointed to the High Court of Australia are more likely to find in favo...
Conventional wisdom holds that appointed judges are superior to elected judges because appointed jud...