What explains the level of violence during civil wars? In this paper, we argue that the size of the ruling coalition is a critical determinant of the severity of conflict. To maintain control over patronage, elites will fight to ward off challengers. The degree to which they use coercion hinges upon the level of private benefits they receive, which is in turn determined by coalition size. Further, we expect democracies to be more constrained in their use of force due to larger government coalitions and constraints on power. To proxy for coalition size, we use new data on the ethnic affiliation of heads of state. An empirical analysis of over 200 armed civil conflicts reveals that conflicts involving smaller ruling coalitions yield a gr...
Civil wars are a recurring phenomenon undermining development in weak states. Faced with the possibi...
This paper examines the influence that rebel and state leaders have on civil war outcomes, arguing t...
This article examines how the civilian constituencies of rebel groups affect their use of violence a...
What explains the level of violence during civil wars? In this paper, we argue that the size of the ...
Democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other. They are also more likely to prevail in w...
The literature on political instability focuses on institutional and leader survival or outcomes lik...
How do coalition governments affect the risk of civil war onset in ethnically divided societies? Exi...
How does the anticipation of external support affect dictators’ domestic political behavior? We lack...
Grievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil wa...
The inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society--a previous...
Otherwise powerful, formidable democracies are tempting targets for international violence because t...
Does the restraint that prevents pairs of democracies from fighting large-scale wars also prevent th...
Many accounts of civil war violence assume that a conflict's master cleavage also explains the local...
In this paper, we replicate and extend Jeremy Wallace's ``Cities, Redistribution, and Authoritarian ...
This paper develops a bargaining model that explains why political power-sharing agreements lead to ...
Civil wars are a recurring phenomenon undermining development in weak states. Faced with the possibi...
This paper examines the influence that rebel and state leaders have on civil war outcomes, arguing t...
This article examines how the civilian constituencies of rebel groups affect their use of violence a...
What explains the level of violence during civil wars? In this paper, we argue that the size of the ...
Democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other. They are also more likely to prevail in w...
The literature on political instability focuses on institutional and leader survival or outcomes lik...
How do coalition governments affect the risk of civil war onset in ethnically divided societies? Exi...
How does the anticipation of external support affect dictators’ domestic political behavior? We lack...
Grievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil wa...
The inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society--a previous...
Otherwise powerful, formidable democracies are tempting targets for international violence because t...
Does the restraint that prevents pairs of democracies from fighting large-scale wars also prevent th...
Many accounts of civil war violence assume that a conflict's master cleavage also explains the local...
In this paper, we replicate and extend Jeremy Wallace's ``Cities, Redistribution, and Authoritarian ...
This paper develops a bargaining model that explains why political power-sharing agreements lead to ...
Civil wars are a recurring phenomenon undermining development in weak states. Faced with the possibi...
This paper examines the influence that rebel and state leaders have on civil war outcomes, arguing t...
This article examines how the civilian constituencies of rebel groups affect their use of violence a...