Aron-Dine, Aviva, Einay, Liran, Finkelstein, Amy, and Cullen, Mark, (2015) "Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Do Dynamic Incentives Matter?" Review of Economics and Statistics 97:4, 725-742
© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of European Economic Associatio...
This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's...
Empirical studies have found it difficult to separately identify adverse selection from moral hazard...
Weisburd, Sarit, (2015) "Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts." Review of Economics a...
Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate whether healt...
This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may ...
International audienceThis paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical a...
This paper exhibits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
International audienceThis paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical a...
International audienceThis paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical a...
International audienceThis paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical a...
This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's...
Abstract. In this paper we explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in...
© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of European Economic Associatio...
This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's...
Empirical studies have found it difficult to separately identify adverse selection from moral hazard...
Weisburd, Sarit, (2015) "Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts." Review of Economics a...
Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate whether healt...
This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may ...
International audienceThis paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical a...
This paper exhibits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
International audienceThis paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical a...
International audienceThis paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical a...
International audienceThis paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical a...
This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's...
Abstract. In this paper we explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in...
© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of European Economic Associatio...
This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's...
Empirical studies have found it difficult to separately identify adverse selection from moral hazard...
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