Would fake news be more efficient to right-wing campaigns? – a hypothesis from the elections of 2018 in Brazil

A campanha presidencial brasileira de 2018 mostrou forte desgaste de imagem da política tradicional (partidos e políticos). Trouxe evidências – que já tinham sido observadas nos Estados Unidos – de que os seguidores da extrema-direita seriam mais propensos a propagar notícias fraudulentas nas redes sociais. O presente artigo revisita várias pesquisas sobre as eleições de 2018 no Brasil e as de 2016 nos Estados Unidos e anota que, ao menos pelos dados disponíveis, o populismo de viés conservador (de direita) dá sinais de ser mais eficaz no uso das fake news, tirando mais vantagens da ruptura entre o debate político e aquilo a que Hannah Arendt deu o nome de “verdade factual”. Resta saber, a partir de agora, se novos estudos confirmarão a maior aptidão do conservadorismo político para o uso das notícias fraudulentas e quais consequências sobrevirão para a ordem democrática.The Brazilian presidential campaign of 2018 showed a strong wastage of the image of traditional politics (parties and politicians). It brought evidences – which had already been observed in the United States in 2016 – that far-right followers would be more likely to spread fake news on social networks. This article revisits several researches on both 2018 Brazilian elections and 2016 elections in the United States and notes that, at least according to available data, conservative (right-wing) populism shows signs of being more efficient in using fake news, taking advantage of the rupture between political debate and the so-called by Hannah Arendt “factual truth”. It remains to be seen, from now on, whether further studies will confirm the greater aptitude of political conservatism for the use of fraudulent news and what consequences will follow for the democratic order