A Study on the Compensation Plan for Top Management with the Public Corporation based on the Cases of U.S. and Japanese Firms

A higher amount of compensation obtained by top management with the public corporation has considerably received a great deal of attention from mass media. So far such a kind of problem has often been treated in the theory of corporate governance. The author describes its status quo and trend based on the latest cases of U.S. and Japanese firms, then, consider it in terms of some points of view including the theory of principal-agent relationship. Today, the shareholders are going criticize the fixed-type of compensation in not proportion to the business results. Under pressure from the shareholders, compensation plan has changed from the fixed-type into a gearing-type to the results. However, such a linkage is not always a panacea. In Japan, the case of window dressing by a securities firm was unveiled, which was rooted in the linkage plan. Furthermore, by adding some concepts such as accounting short-termism, the market for corporate control, the picture as a whole is summarized. A higher amount of compensation would be a kind of agency cost corresponding to the change of the market condition.3KJ00004892719departmental bulletin pape