We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the information of the players and on the mode of interaction between them. On the basis of information the classification is as follows: (a) partial-observation (both players have partial view of the game); (b) one-sided complete-observation (one player has complete observation); and (c) complete-observation (both players have complete view of the game). On the basis of mode of interaction we have the following classification: (a) concurrent (both players interact simultaneously); and (b) turn-based (both players interact in turn). The two sources of randomness in these games are randomness in transition function and randomness in strategies. In ...
Abstract. This paper introduces general games with incomplete information in which the number, as we...
We consider two-player zero-sum stochastic games on graphs with ω-regular winning conditions specifi...
Unpredictable behavior is central for optimal play in many strategic situations because a predictabl...
We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the i...
We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the i...
International audienceWe consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified...
Abstract Strategies in repeated games can be classified as towhether or not they use memory and/or r...
We study multiplayer games in which the participants have access to only limited randomness. This co...
Strategies in repeated games can be classified as to whether or not they use memory and/or randomiza...
In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the ...
We study games played on graphs by an arbitrary number of players withnon-zero sum objectives. The p...
In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the ...
International audienceShortest-path games are two-player zero-sum games played on a graph equipped w...
hornliafa.jussieu.fr Graph games of infinite length are a natural model for open reactive processes:...
In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the ...
Abstract. This paper introduces general games with incomplete information in which the number, as we...
We consider two-player zero-sum stochastic games on graphs with ω-regular winning conditions specifi...
Unpredictable behavior is central for optimal play in many strategic situations because a predictabl...
We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the i...
We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the i...
International audienceWe consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified...
Abstract Strategies in repeated games can be classified as towhether or not they use memory and/or r...
We study multiplayer games in which the participants have access to only limited randomness. This co...
Strategies in repeated games can be classified as to whether or not they use memory and/or randomiza...
In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the ...
We study games played on graphs by an arbitrary number of players withnon-zero sum objectives. The p...
In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the ...
International audienceShortest-path games are two-player zero-sum games played on a graph equipped w...
hornliafa.jussieu.fr Graph games of infinite length are a natural model for open reactive processes:...
In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the ...
Abstract. This paper introduces general games with incomplete information in which the number, as we...
We consider two-player zero-sum stochastic games on graphs with ω-regular winning conditions specifi...
Unpredictable behavior is central for optimal play in many strategic situations because a predictabl...