This Note will apply Judge Kavanaugh’s proposed mechanism to the interpretation of the Title IX prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex. Part I discusses recent cases decided by the Roberts Court that demonstrate the difficulties with the current jurisprudential approach to the clarity versus ambiguity determination. Part II explores Judge Kavanaugh’s recent proposal for reducing threshold findings of ambiguity. Part III considers various interpretive methods and applies Judge Kavanaugh’s proposal in the context of Title IX. Finally, this Note concludes that Judge Kavanaugh’s approach, while most dramatically transforming the purposivist approach, also has consequences for the textualist inquiry
Last October, Judge Brett Kavanaugh told the Heritage Foundation that statutory interpretation ideal...
The framework for judicial review of administrative interpretations of regulatory statutes set forth...
Section I begins with a brief discussion of the maxims of statutory interpretation and an explanatio...
Judicial review of agency statutory interpretations depends heavily on the linguistic concept of amb...
“How much ambiguity is enough?” was the deceptively simple question repeatedly put forward by Justic...
Since implied congressional intent is the basis for the Chevron doctrine, courts cannot simply presu...
When decided, both Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and United Sta...
An increasing number of judges, policymakers, and scholars have advocated eliminating or narrowing C...
Most scholarship on statutory interpretation discusses what courts should do with ambiguous statutes...
Amid debate over pivotal issues such as abortion rights and presidential power, senators deliberatin...
This Article explores the basic question of statutory interpretation. The disagreement among scholar...
“The Problem” occurs when a statute’s provisions become contradictory or unworkable in the context o...
How should courts handle interpretive choices, such as when statutory text strongly points to one st...
By leaving the meaning of a statute—or procedural rule—undecided, ambiguous appellate decisions crea...
In skewering the Supreme Court\u27s recent decision in United States v. Mead Corp., Justice Scalia\u...
Last October, Judge Brett Kavanaugh told the Heritage Foundation that statutory interpretation ideal...
The framework for judicial review of administrative interpretations of regulatory statutes set forth...
Section I begins with a brief discussion of the maxims of statutory interpretation and an explanatio...
Judicial review of agency statutory interpretations depends heavily on the linguistic concept of amb...
“How much ambiguity is enough?” was the deceptively simple question repeatedly put forward by Justic...
Since implied congressional intent is the basis for the Chevron doctrine, courts cannot simply presu...
When decided, both Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and United Sta...
An increasing number of judges, policymakers, and scholars have advocated eliminating or narrowing C...
Most scholarship on statutory interpretation discusses what courts should do with ambiguous statutes...
Amid debate over pivotal issues such as abortion rights and presidential power, senators deliberatin...
This Article explores the basic question of statutory interpretation. The disagreement among scholar...
“The Problem” occurs when a statute’s provisions become contradictory or unworkable in the context o...
How should courts handle interpretive choices, such as when statutory text strongly points to one st...
By leaving the meaning of a statute—or procedural rule—undecided, ambiguous appellate decisions crea...
In skewering the Supreme Court\u27s recent decision in United States v. Mead Corp., Justice Scalia\u...
Last October, Judge Brett Kavanaugh told the Heritage Foundation that statutory interpretation ideal...
The framework for judicial review of administrative interpretations of regulatory statutes set forth...
Section I begins with a brief discussion of the maxims of statutory interpretation and an explanatio...