Determinants Of Stock Option Use By Chinese Companies

Using a sample of 225 stock option grants over the period January 2006 to June 2013, we examine the economic determinants of stock option use in Chinese firms from the optimal contract and managerial power approaches. We investigate whether the same economic factors can explain stock option awards to different types of target grantees (including directors and senior executives, technical and business personnel, and special talents introduced in the future). In consistent with the optimal contract theory, we find that the scope of stock option plans is negatively associated with ?rm size, dividend dummy, and three ownership measures (managerial ownership, blockholder ownership, and foreign ownership). Furthermore, we find that the scope of stock option plans is positively related to book-to-market ratio and prior stock returns, but the coefficients are significant only when the stock options awards cover senior managers. We also find that the impact of risk is different when options are targeted to different types of employees. In consistent with the managerial power theory, we ?nd that the scope of stock option plans is inversely related to state ownership. As for the other economic factors, their degree of impact is found to be different across a broad base of employees. In general, ownership variables are more relevant to key technical and business personnel, while firm characteristics variables are more relevant to top management