What's cooking in Washington? Interest group lobbying and the construction of food and agricultural policy

This dissertation examines the strategies lobbyists use to influence public policy in the agriculture and food policy arena. Previous studies of lobbying have produced conflicting evidence for the impact of lobbying on the content of federal laws and regulations, despite the fact that, in the domain of agriculture alone, interest groups spent over $133,786,278 to lobby the federal government in 2015. Such an investment demonstrates that interest groups are confident that their lobbying strategies produce tangible benefits for the industries and interests they represent. I argue that an organization’s material resources, social connections, and prior experience lobbying in Washington determine the strategies they use to achieve their policy goals, and that Congressional polarization is increasing the power of interest group influence. Using an original dataset, based on hand-coded lobbying disclosure reports, and interviews with policy experts and lobbyists, I find clear and compelling evidence that lobbyists strategically direct their lobbying efforts to different government venues, depending on the nature of their relationship with members of Congress and members of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, interest groups with the greatest material resources are not only more likely to lobby, but they are also more effective in their use of these resources to leverage their relationships with members of Congress for more efficient lobbying efforts. This dissertation is the first work of its kind to uncover the latent reasons driving lobbyists to utilize distinct strategies from one another in a policy arena crucial to American public health, environmental conservation, and national security.Governmen