Frege's ontology : a critical examination of its foundations

There are two contentious ontological claims that Frege makes. Firstly, that predicates have reference and secondly, that their reference is 'unsaturated'. It is the primary aim of this essay to examine the latter claim. Following an introductory exposition of the Fregean concepts crucial to this essay, the claim that the references of predicates are 'unsaturated' is considered as a response to the problem of the unity of the proposition. As a special case of this problem, F.H. Bradley's attack on relations is discussed. It is argued that once one understands that relations are unsaturated, Bradley's problem, and by extension the problem of the unity of the proposition, disappears. But a crucial semantic principle is shown to emerge from this attempted solution to these problems: Any language capable of talking about relations and concepts cannot refer to these by means of proper names. This principle, it then appears, renders us incapable of specifying in a given instance which concept a predicate refers to. Two recent attempts to avoid this problem are discussed and rejected. Insight gained from this discussion leads to a third, purely Fregean solution to the problem. This solution, which is forced upon Frege by his own principles, is seen to involve him in a vicious circle. It appears that Frege's ontological doctrines are ill-founded - that they cannot solve the very problems for which they were designed.Arts, Faculty ofPhilosophy, Department ofGraduat