In practice, scoring rules elicit good probability estimates from individuals, while betting markets elicit good consensus estimates from groups. Market scoring rules combine these features, eliciting estimates from individuals or groups, with groups costing no more than individuals. Regarding a bet on one event given another event, only logarithmic versions preserve the probability of the given event. Logarithmic versions also preserve the conditional probabilities of other events, and so preserve conditional independence relations. Given logarithmic rules that elicit relative probabilities of base event pairs, it costs no more to elicit estimates on all combinations of these base events
For some applications, prediction markets that rely entirely on voluntary transactions between indiv...
Ascoring rule S(x; q) provides away of judging the quality of a quoted probability density q for a r...
We construct a budget-balanced wagering mechanism that flexibly extracts information about event pro...
In practice, scoring rules elicit good probability estimates from individuals, while betting markets...
The logarithmic market scoring rule has emerged as a standard automated market maker. The approach i...
Proper scoring rules, particularly when used as the basis for a prediction market, are powerful tool...
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring ru...
For some applications, prediction markets that rely entirely on voluntary transactions between indiv...
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring ru...
The primary goal of a prediction market is to elicit and aggregate information about some future eve...
We develop a scoring rule tailored to a decision maker who makes simultaneous bets on events that oc...
The primary goal of a prediction market is to elicit and aggregate information about some future eve...
A long-standing question in statistics is how best to aggregate the probabilistic beliefs of multipl...
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring ru...
Prediction markets are markets that are set up to aggregate information from a population of traders...
For some applications, prediction markets that rely entirely on voluntary transactions between indiv...
Ascoring rule S(x; q) provides away of judging the quality of a quoted probability density q for a r...
We construct a budget-balanced wagering mechanism that flexibly extracts information about event pro...
In practice, scoring rules elicit good probability estimates from individuals, while betting markets...
The logarithmic market scoring rule has emerged as a standard automated market maker. The approach i...
Proper scoring rules, particularly when used as the basis for a prediction market, are powerful tool...
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring ru...
For some applications, prediction markets that rely entirely on voluntary transactions between indiv...
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring ru...
The primary goal of a prediction market is to elicit and aggregate information about some future eve...
We develop a scoring rule tailored to a decision maker who makes simultaneous bets on events that oc...
The primary goal of a prediction market is to elicit and aggregate information about some future eve...
A long-standing question in statistics is how best to aggregate the probabilistic beliefs of multipl...
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring ru...
Prediction markets are markets that are set up to aggregate information from a population of traders...
For some applications, prediction markets that rely entirely on voluntary transactions between indiv...
Ascoring rule S(x; q) provides away of judging the quality of a quoted probability density q for a r...
We construct a budget-balanced wagering mechanism that flexibly extracts information about event pro...