Add to ORKGIn common treatments of deontic logic, the obligatory is what is true in all deontically ideal possible worlds. In this article, I offer a new semantics for Standard Deontic Logic with Leibnizian intensions rather than possible worlds. Even though the new semantics furnishes models that resemble Venn diagrams, the semantics captures the strong soundness and completeness of Standard Deontic Logic. Since, unlike possible worlds, many Leibnizian intensions are not maximally consistent entities, we can amend the semantics to invalidate the inference rule which ensures that all tautologies are obligatory. I sketch this amended semantics to show how it invalidates the rule in a new way
Deontic attitudes, such as obligations, are normally formalised in a modal logic in which some possi...
It’s widely accepted that normativity is not subject to truth values. The underlying reasoning is th...
In 1926, Ernst Mally, an Austrian logician, has introduced a system of deontic logic in which he has...
In common treatments of deontic logic, the obligatory is what is true in all deontically ideal possi...
AbstractIn order to avoid the paradoxes of standard deontic logic, we have to give up the semantic c...
I go through various arguments why the K-principle (aka Distributivity Axiom), O(p→q)→(Op→Oq), a cor...
Las interpretaciones semánticas más fructíferas que se han ofrecido de los diversos sistemas axiomát...
Traditional approaches in deontic logic have focused on the so-called reportative reading of obligat...
In the standard theory of deontic modals, ‘ought’ is understood as expressing a propositional operat...
Over the last fifteen years, linguists and philosophers of language have reexamined the canonical, K...
There has been a recent surge of work on deontic modality within philosophy of language. This work h...
Standard deontic logic (SDL) is defined on the basis of possible world semantics and is a logic of a...
In this thesis, the main focus is on deontic logic as a tool for formal representation of moral reas...
Contrastivism about `ought' holds that `ought' claims are relativized, at least implicitly, to sets ...
article describes a formal semantics for the deontic concepts-- the concepts of permission and oblig...
Deontic attitudes, such as obligations, are normally formalised in a modal logic in which some possi...
It’s widely accepted that normativity is not subject to truth values. The underlying reasoning is th...
In 1926, Ernst Mally, an Austrian logician, has introduced a system of deontic logic in which he has...
In common treatments of deontic logic, the obligatory is what is true in all deontically ideal possi...
AbstractIn order to avoid the paradoxes of standard deontic logic, we have to give up the semantic c...
I go through various arguments why the K-principle (aka Distributivity Axiom), O(p→q)→(Op→Oq), a cor...
Las interpretaciones semánticas más fructíferas que se han ofrecido de los diversos sistemas axiomát...
Traditional approaches in deontic logic have focused on the so-called reportative reading of obligat...
In the standard theory of deontic modals, ‘ought’ is understood as expressing a propositional operat...
Over the last fifteen years, linguists and philosophers of language have reexamined the canonical, K...
There has been a recent surge of work on deontic modality within philosophy of language. This work h...
Standard deontic logic (SDL) is defined on the basis of possible world semantics and is a logic of a...
In this thesis, the main focus is on deontic logic as a tool for formal representation of moral reas...
Contrastivism about `ought' holds that `ought' claims are relativized, at least implicitly, to sets ...
article describes a formal semantics for the deontic concepts-- the concepts of permission and oblig...
Deontic attitudes, such as obligations, are normally formalised in a modal logic in which some possi...
It’s widely accepted that normativity is not subject to truth values. The underlying reasoning is th...
In 1926, Ernst Mally, an Austrian logician, has introduced a system of deontic logic in which he has...