This essay considers a mixed-effects modeling practice and its implications for the philosophical debate surrounding reductive explanation. Mixed-effects modeling is a species of the multilevel modeling practice, where a single model incorporates simultaneously two (or even more) levels of explanatory variables to explain a phenomenon of interest. I argue that this practice makes the position of explanatory reductionism held by many philosophers untenable because it violates two central tenets of explanatory reductionism: single-level preference and lower-level obsession
This paper critiques the new mechanistic explanatory program on grounds that, even when applied to t...
This paper understands reductionism as a relation between explanations, not theories. It argues that...
Multiscale modeling techniques have attracted increasing attention by philosophers of science, but t...
This essay considers a mixed-effects modeling practice and its implications for the philosophical de...
This essay considers a mixed-effects modeling practice and its implications for the philosophical de...
A common argument against explanatory reductionism is that higher-level explanations are sometimes o...
Positing levels of explanation has played an important role in philosophy of science. This facilitat...
Anti-reductionists hold that special science explanations of some phenomena are objectively better t...
Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only ...
In the face of causal complexity, scientists reconstitute phenomena in order to arrive at a more sim...
This Research Topic aimed at deepening our understanding of the levels and explanations that are of ...
This paper addresses the recent resurgence of Nagel style reduction in the philosophical literature....
Recent literature has raised what I'll call the 'multiscale argument' against reduction (see e.g. Ba...
Detailed examinations of scientific practice have revealed that the use of idealized models in the ...
This article discusses minimal model explanations, which we argue are distinct from various causal, ...
This paper critiques the new mechanistic explanatory program on grounds that, even when applied to t...
This paper understands reductionism as a relation between explanations, not theories. It argues that...
Multiscale modeling techniques have attracted increasing attention by philosophers of science, but t...
This essay considers a mixed-effects modeling practice and its implications for the philosophical de...
This essay considers a mixed-effects modeling practice and its implications for the philosophical de...
A common argument against explanatory reductionism is that higher-level explanations are sometimes o...
Positing levels of explanation has played an important role in philosophy of science. This facilitat...
Anti-reductionists hold that special science explanations of some phenomena are objectively better t...
Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only ...
In the face of causal complexity, scientists reconstitute phenomena in order to arrive at a more sim...
This Research Topic aimed at deepening our understanding of the levels and explanations that are of ...
This paper addresses the recent resurgence of Nagel style reduction in the philosophical literature....
Recent literature has raised what I'll call the 'multiscale argument' against reduction (see e.g. Ba...
Detailed examinations of scientific practice have revealed that the use of idealized models in the ...
This article discusses minimal model explanations, which we argue are distinct from various causal, ...
This paper critiques the new mechanistic explanatory program on grounds that, even when applied to t...
This paper understands reductionism as a relation between explanations, not theories. It argues that...
Multiscale modeling techniques have attracted increasing attention by philosophers of science, but t...