Unsplittable load balancing in a network of charging stations under QoS guarantees

The operation of the power grid is becoming more stressed, due to the addition of new large loads represented by electric vehicles (EVs) and a more intermittent supply due to the incorporation of renewable sources. As a consequence, the coordination and control of projected EV demand in a network of fast charging stations becomes a critical and challenging problem. In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic based decentralized control mechanism to alleviate negative impacts from the EV demand. The proposed mechanism takes into consideration the nonuniform spatial distribution of EVs that induces uneven power demand at each charging facility, and aims to: 1) avoid straining grid resources by offering price incentives, so that customers accept being routed to less busy stations; 2) maximize total revenue by serving more customers with the same amount of grid resources; and 3) provide charging service to customers with a certain level of quality-of-service (QoS), the latter defined as the long term customer blocking probability. We examine three scenarios of increased complexity that gradually approximate real world settings. The obtained results show that the proposed framework leads to substantial performance improvements in terms of the aforementioned goals when compared to current state of affairs