Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers’ quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanat...
I study the matching of heterogeneous workers and firms in the labor market. In particular, I examin...
We consider a continuous-time labor matching model with endogenous separation. Firms initially lack ...
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to com...
Markets sometimes unravel in time, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attribute...
I offer a competitive explanation for the rush toward early contracting in matching markets. The exp...
Abstract. We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in match-ing markets. O...
This paper proposes a new explanation of the job quality issue in search and matching models, which ...
International audienceThe performance of the labor market depends not only on the quantity of jobs i...
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanat...
International audienceIn a circular matching model with bargained wages, firms rank their applicants...
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in match-ing markets. Our explana...
In this study the behaviour of firms and workers is modelled simultaneously in a labour market chara...
Unraveling, the excessively early matching of future workers to employers, leads to hiring decisions...
This paper proposes a new explanation of the job quality issue in search and matching models, which ...
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanat...
I study the matching of heterogeneous workers and firms in the labor market. In particular, I examin...
We consider a continuous-time labor matching model with endogenous separation. Firms initially lack ...
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to com...
Markets sometimes unravel in time, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attribute...
I offer a competitive explanation for the rush toward early contracting in matching markets. The exp...
Abstract. We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in match-ing markets. O...
This paper proposes a new explanation of the job quality issue in search and matching models, which ...
International audienceThe performance of the labor market depends not only on the quantity of jobs i...
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanat...
International audienceIn a circular matching model with bargained wages, firms rank their applicants...
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in match-ing markets. Our explana...
In this study the behaviour of firms and workers is modelled simultaneously in a labour market chara...
Unraveling, the excessively early matching of future workers to employers, leads to hiring decisions...
This paper proposes a new explanation of the job quality issue in search and matching models, which ...
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanat...
I study the matching of heterogeneous workers and firms in the labor market. In particular, I examin...
We consider a continuous-time labor matching model with endogenous separation. Firms initially lack ...