Regswetenskap en regsfilosofie: ’n onontkombare vennootskap

In this article the relationship between legal philosophy and legal science is compared with that of a partnership which implies that the partners have distinct reciprocal duties. In such a partnership a reformational approach in legal philosophy has the task of convincing other legal scientists that the former can make a meaningful contribution towards raising the level of legal research and education. This does not mean that legal scientists have to become legal philosophers; they do however, have the responsibility to take cognisance of important basic theoretical insights developed by a reformational legal philosophy. Such an approach could preclude them from attempts to reinvent the legal philosophical wheel, especially if they are prepared to stand on the shoulders of a long array of legal philosophical giants. The application of basic concepts of a reformational legal philosophy should, however, be done in a creative way in order to prevent them from becoming epigones. The danger of legal philosophical systematics becoming an intellectual straitjacket could only be avoided if it remains open (i) towards its own presuppositions, (ii) towards legal reality encompassing positive law and legal principles, (iii) towards other legal theories and (iv) towards other relevant disciplines. Furthermore, the possibility of a secularization of the contributions of a reformational legal philosophy is discussed. In conclusion the need for the acceptance of dynamic supra-arbitrary legal principles and possible contributions of a reformational legal philosophy accepting them, is underlined