The reality of spacetime

An anti-haecceitist version of spacetime substantivalism-- sup s ophisticated substantivalism sup - -is defended. Part I looks at classical mechanics. The historical origins of the substantivalist-relationalist debate are examined. I argue that Descartes' definition of motion has been widely misunderstood but that Newton's criticisms of Cartesian relationalism are nonetheless on target. I examine Leibniz's arguments against substantival space, as presented in his correspondence with Clarke. My conclusion is that their real target should have been haecceitism, not substantivalism. I outline an anti-haecceitist version of classical spacetime substantivalism as a response to the static and kinematic shift arguments. I then review Mach's and Poincare's criticisms of Newton's absolute space, and consider Barbour's approach to dynamics which they inspired. I conclude that Barbour and Bertotti's intrinsic particle dynamics offers a viable and superior alternative to substantivalist interpretations of classical mechanics. In Part II I defend sophisticated substantivalism, against objections and alternatives, as a response to the hole argument. I argue that the metric field of general relativity should be viewed as representing spacetime structure, not as representing a material field. I then consider whether Barbour's Machian framework can again undermine substantivalism by providing a relational alternative to general relativity. I argue that it fails to do so because it yields a theory most naturally interpreted as concerning the evolution of substantival space, conceived along sophisticated substantivalist lines. Problems with treating such a theory as fundamental are also highlighted. In Part III I investigate whether or not the phenomena of handedness and parity violation support substantivalism. I argue that they do not, and offer a relational understanding of handedness and of parity-violating physics. In doing so, I consider the relevance of haecceitism and ant